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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to discover the optimal amount of salary 
dispersion for an NBA team and the affect that dispersion has on team wins and 
revenue.  The optimal amount of salary dispersion could be different for teams that 
want to maximize wins and teams that want to maximize revenue.  For the purpose 
of this study, five different measures of salary dispersion are utilized to most 
effectively understand the effects.  Empirical models are constructed and OLS 
regressions employed using cross-sectional data from the 2006-07 NBA season 
through the 2010-11 season to understand the relationship.  The empirical evidence 
supports the idea that the larger the salary dispersion the greater the number of wins 
achieved.  The evidence also implies that the amount of dispersion does not 
significantly affect the amount of revenue generated by a team. According to this 
study, a win maximizing team should attempt to hire as many superstars as possible 
given the NBA’s salary constraints. 
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I. Introduction 
Teams in the National Basketball Association (NBA) face important salary allocation 
decisions.  NBA players provide different value to their respective team and therefore are worth 
different amounts of money.  General managers have to determine how to allocate the total 
salary given to their signed players.  An important research question to consider is: What is the 
best way to allocate salary amongst an NBA team?  The term “best” in this situation can be 
interpreted in different ways.  ”Best” can be viewed as a salary distribution that maximizes wins.  
Wins are obviously important to both fans and management.  “Best” can also be viewed as a 
salary distribution that maximizes revenue as each team is attempting to make money.   
There are many reasons that this research is important.  Understanding the results of salary 
distribution could play a significant role in the shaping of the league.  Also, greater knowledge of 
how salary distribution affects wins and revenues could be helpful to general managers as they 
construct their teams more appropriately.   
With general managers’ knowledge of effective team construction increasing, the 
competitive balance of the NBA might improve.  The biggest problem any sports league faces is 
competitive imbalance.  A large amount of imbalance can lead to a contraction in the number of 
teams, or even the disbanding of the entire league (Rosen et al, 2000).  The NBA has the biggest 
competitive imbalance problem of any of the four major sports leagues when it comes to number 
of wins and amount of revenue generated.  At the end of the 2010-11 NBA season, two teams, 
the Boston Celtics and Los Angeles Lakers, have won a combined 33 NBA Championships in 
the NBA’s 65 years.  In addition, differences across teams in revenue generation are enormous.  
Within the last five years, there has been up to a 254% difference between the top and bottom 
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teams in total revenue.  The competitive imbalance problem deals with a problem at the league 
level, whereas the research question at hand deals with the team level disparity.  They are 
connected, however, because if general managers knew how salary dispersion on a team level 
affects wins and revenues, they could use this knowledge to construct more competitive teams.  
This would increase the health of the league and everyone involved with the NBA would reap 
the benefits.  
In addition to these facts on the importance of this topic in the NBA, this research is feasible 
because of the availability of relevant data.  Production and productivity outcomes are more 
easily measured in sports compared to other business firms.  Basketball players’ productivity is 
much more easily measured than workers in other firms because of the statistics that are 
compiled with the sport.   
This study aims to determine the optimal amounts of salary dispersion to maximize wins and 
maximize revenue.  Based on economic theory provided in the following section, I hypothesize 
that the optimal amount of salary dispersion will be different for teams that have a goal of 
maximizing wins and teams that have a goal of maximizing revenue.  Labor demand theory, 
human capital theory, and superstar theory all play a role in the following section. Based on these 
economic theories, I hypothesize that the greater the dispersion the greater the number of wins 
achieved.  I also hypothesize that the greater the dispersion the greater the amount of revenue 
generated. 
II. Theory and Literature Review 
While a large amount of literature is published on the effects of wage disparities within 
firms, there is little on the effects of salary dispersion in the NBA.  Most literature on salary 
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dispersion in sports deals with the effect of salary dispersion on the number of wins and does not 
consider revenue.  The literature that deals with wins and salary dispersion is relatively new and 
has mostly appeared after the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the NBA owners 
and players’ union was developed at the start of the 1995 season (Berri et al, 2004).  This was the 
first time in NBA history where the salary dispersion within teams really exploded.  The 
“middle-class” of the NBA was basically lost and teams had a combination of very high salaried 
players and relatively low salaried players (Berri et al, 2004).  Many teams, as a result of the 
terms of the new CBA, allocated a substantial amount of team payroll to a few stars and then 
completed their roster with players offered the NBA minimum wage or close to it.   
Berri and Jewell (2004) in addition to Katayama and Nuch (2011) saw this rapid change 
in distribution of salaries as a chance for a natural experiment to understand how changes in 
disparity impact team/firm performance.  Each study defined the dispersion variable differently, 
but came to the same conclusions.  Both studies found the amount of salary dispersion within a 
team to have no significant effect on team performance.  The authors say that, for this industry at 
least, the idea of tournament theory, which states that pay inequality results in higher worker 
productivity, and pay compression school of thought, which states that wage equality will 
enhance cooperation and therefore performance, are both inapplicable (Berri et al, 2004).  The 
datasets used, however, were admittedly somewhat small and both Berri and Katayama believe 
there could be a significant effect if the sample size was larger (Katayama et al, 2011).  Another 
similarity of these authors was their conclusion that salary dispersion might not affect team 
performance because the lower salaried players will perform to their best abilities to maximize 
the amount of salary they can obtain on their next contract. 
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Stefan Kesenne (2007) discusses the multiple objectives of professional sports teams in  
The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports.  He acknowledges that professional sports 
organizations are businesses that attempt to maximize revenue and profit, but at the same time 
many teams are focused on maximizing wins.  Studies have been inconclusive in accepting or 
rejecting the profit or win maximization goals.  Kesenne provides a simple diagram that leads to 
his underlying hypothesis that revenue maximizing teams and win maximizing teams will have a 
differing amount of salary dispersion. Figure 1 shows the different amount of talent demand 
levels depending on team goals.  The number of talents, or superstars, is represented on the 
horizontal axis and total revenue and cost is represented on the vertical axis. The variables t1, t2, 
etcetera, on the horizontal axis do not specifically mean one superstar, two superstars, and so 
forth.  They represent different possible number of talents on a team, but not incremental 
increases in talents.  The farther to the right on the horizontal axis, the higher the total number of 
talents on a team.  Total cost (C) increases as the number of talents increases, but the revenue 
curve (R) is concave.  According to Kesenne, this is a result of revenue increasing with the team 
becoming more successful, but then decreasing if the team becomes too good and public interest 
fades because of lack of uncertainty of outcomes.  A revenue maximizing team will hire at the t2 
amount of talents on this graph, where the revenue curve is at its highest point.  Under the 
assumption that the most successful teams have more talents, a win maximizing team would 
want to hire as many talents as financially possible.  Therefore, a win maximizing team will hire 
t4 amount of talents on this graph, where they can maximize the amount of talents without losing 
any money (Kesenne, 2007).  This analysis makes clear that the revenue maximization point and 
win maximization point requires a different amount of talents and therefore a differing amount of 
salary dispersion.   
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The effect of superstars on revenue has also been extensively studied, especially by 
Sherwin Rosen (1981) and Walter Oi (2008).  Rosen discusses that the settings in which 
superstars are found share two common elements.  The first is a close connection between 
personal reward and the size of a person’s own market, and the second is a strong tendency for 
market size and reward to be skewed toward the most talented people in a specific activity.  Oi 
believes that superstars’ gigantic income and rare talents is what attracts attention.  They both 
acknowledge that superstars are of interest to fans and, therefore, create attention.  In most 
circumstances superstars are considered entertaining, and it is the search for entertainment, 
admiration, and a desire to understand how they are as good as they are that creates revenue for 
their firm.      
Jerry Hausman and Gregory Leonard (1997) studied the effect that NBA superstars had 
on both team and league revenue during a number of seasons in the 1990’s.  Some of the avenues 
that superstars help produce revenues are through increases in television ratings, game 
attendance, and sport paraphernalia sales.  They found that a superstar positively impacts both 
his team’s total revenue and other teams’ revenue (Hausman et al, 1997).  This means that small 
market teams would attempt to free-ride off large market teams.  According to Hausman, a 
Figure 1: Kesenne's Theory of Sports Teams 
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suggestion to fix this free rider benefit is to impose a salary cap.  A salary cap, however, could 
over correct the superstar externality.  The NBA has tried to correct this problem by instituting a 
soft salary cap (Coon, 2011).  This means that there are a few exceptions to the salary cap rule 
and teams are able to have a payroll that exceeds the salary cap, but are fined when payrolls 
exceed a certain luxury tax level.  The luxury tax level is determined by a complicated formula, 
but is typically in the range of $12-13 million above the salary cap.   
Salary dispersion and the effect it has on teams can also be explained within the 
framework of demand theory.  Marginal revenue product (MRP) is the demand for labor curve.    
Human capital is an important concept in relation to the MRP curve because it is a major 
determinant of the marginal productivity of workers.  Human capital refers to the productive 
capabilities of human beings as income generating components in the economy (Rosen, 2008).  
According to human capital theory, the higher the productivity that is obtained through 
investments in education and training, the higher amount of income a person should achieve.  
Also, human capital theory suggests that the returns to investments in education and training are 
directly related to the individual’s innate ability and physical endowments.  Therefore, the higher 
the basketball player’s skill, the higher the amount of income he should generate and the higher 
his MRP.   
According to Oi (2008), small differences in talent can be associated with large 
differences in income, especially when the market size is big, which is definitely the case with 
the NBA.  This idea is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 3 shows that with increased training 
all players’ marginal product increases, but superstars’ marginal product increases by a larger 
amount.  The same thing occurs in Figure 2 with marginal revenue product increasing with 
training, but superstars’ marginal revenue product increases by an even greater amount than it 
7 
 
did with marginal product in comparison to the normal players.  This large difference in MRP 
allows superstars to earn a high income compared to normal players and could cause great salary 
dispersion within a team.   
Each team, in essence, constructs its own demand curve and has a different curve than 
each other team (Rosen et al, 2000).  This is in part because talent is distributed differently 
across teams.  With the knowledge of the MRP of players and the presence of a salary cap, 
demand curves can be understood.  With a larger number of high skilled players, a large amount 
of the team’s total salary, which is restricted by the salary cap and luxury tax level, is devoted to 
a few players.  Therefore, the demand curve would be very steep and inelastic.  Teams with more 
balanced salary dispersion will have a flatter more elastic demand curve (Rosen et al, 2000).  
This idea is represented in Figures 4 and 5.  Figure 4 represents a MRP curve of a team that 
employs a few superstars and the rest below average players, therefore creating an uneven 
distribution of talent.  The superstars, as a result of their high skill level, receive larger salaries.  
Given the salary constraints a team faces, the rest of the team is filled with below average skill 
level players who receive much smaller salaries.  This uneven distribution of talent, therefore, 
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creates a large amount of salary dispersion and an inelastic MRP curve.  Figure 5 represents a 
MRP curve for a team with players of similar abilities.  Certain players would still make more 
than others, but the overall salary dispersion for the team would be much less.  This more 
balanced distribution of talent, therefore, creates little salary dispersion and an elastic MRP curve.  
Free agency in the NBA allows players to negotiate their contracts.  Teams have to bid 
for players and players can decide if they believe the offer is fair.  The potential producer surplus 
obtained by the team that signs the player is squeezed out by the player as a result of the ability 
to negotiate.  At the extreme, players receive their personal MRP and teams receive no producer 
surplus.  An interesting part to this is that teams offer salaries to players at what they believe the 
player’s future MRP will be.  The decision process of whom to sign and for what price enables 
each team to create its own unique demand curve (Rosen et al, 2000). 
Kesenne’s theory of professional sports teams along with demand for labor theory sets 
the stage for the remainder of this research study.  When looking into the effects of salary 
distribution amongst NBA teams, both of these theories are relevant.  They suggest that salary 
distribution can have a significant effect on the distribution of talent across teams.  This will 
cause variation in MP schedules and MRP curves in asymmetric ways.  Therefore, salary 
9 
 
distribution can affect both wins and revenues, but not necessarily in the same way.  The 
remainder of the paper will analyze the actual effects of salary distribution on wins and revenues 
in the NBA.   
III. Data 
Two different models each employing cross-sectional data are used to determine the 
effect of salary distribution on wins and revenues for NBA teams.  This section discusses the 
data and the next section defines the variables in terms of definition, importance, and expected 
effect.   
In the first model, the Wins Model, the number of wins a team achieves during the 
regular season is the dependent variable.  It includes regular season wins, and not playoff wins, 
because every team participates in exactly 82 regular season games whereas not every team 
makes the playoffs.  Using only regular season wins allows the study to be more consistent and 
accurate.  This data is compiled from the NBA’s website ("NBA.com").  In the second model, 
the Revenue Model, the team’s total revenue of each season is the dependent variable.  Forbes 
publishes valuations and other reported money figures, such as revenue, of sports teams every 
year (The Business of Basketball, 2011).  The data for this study are from the 2006-07 to 2010-
2011 seasons.  
Total television market size in each NBA team’s metropolitan area needs to be accounted 
for as that could play a role in a team’s revenue and wins.  This data is reported by Nielson 
Ratings, which is the most credible source when it comes to television monitoring (“Local 
Television Market Universe Estimates").  One limitation to the Nielson Ratings, however, is that 
it only reports figures for U.S. cities.  The NBA is a multinational league with one team being 
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located in Toronto, Canada.  The Bureau of Broadcast Measurement (BBM) is Canada’s 
equivalent of the United State’s Nielson Ratings.  The only year of data reported, during the 
range of this study, for Toronto’s television market size was for the 2008-09 year.  The other 
four years of television market size data for Toronto are estimations based on Toronto’s 
population. 
Another piece of data that is pertinent to this study is the luxury tax level in the NBA for 
each of the seasons.  These figures are taken from the NBA’s website ("NBA.com").   
Finally, the last data that are needed are total team salaries, to see if each given team is 
above or below the luxury tax level, and a breakdown of team salaries by player in order to 
analyze the amount of wage dispersion for each given team.  This data is reported by USAToday, 
which is a very reliable source for this type of data.  Despite the reliability, there was a problem 
with some of the information retrieved from this source ("National Basketball Association 
Salaries").  When analyzing the salary data of the 2009-10 Houston Rockets, it was evident that 
the database double counted one player.  Yao Ming, a player on the Houston Rockets, was 
included twice and this was corrected by removing the duplicate observation.  Another 
shortcoming from this source was that it did not include the 2006-07 and 2007-08 Seattle 
Supersonics in its database as a result of their relocation to Oklahoma City.  The salary figures 
for the two years of data in this study where Seattle did have an NBA team comes from the 
NBA’s website ("NBA.com").    
IV. Empirical Model  
The empirical model section proceeds in three subsections.  First, the dependent variables 
for each model are discussed.  Then, the different definitions of wage dispersion that are used in 
11 
 
this study are discussed in more detail. And lastly, the other explanatory variables that are 
needed as control variables in the regression model are discussed. 
A. Dependent Variables 
In this study, OLS regressions will be used to analyze the effect salary dispersion has on 
team performance and revenue.  The dependent variable changes from the Wins Model to the 
Revenue Model.  In the Wins Model, number of wins a team achieved during the regular season 
will be the dependent variable, and in the Revenue Model the total revenue generated by a team 
will be the dependent variable. 
B. Salary Dispersion Measures 
To better understand the relationship between salary dispersion in terms of team 
performance and team revenue, multiple measures of dispersion are utilized.  Salary dispersion 
can be defined in a variety of ways, and this study investigates five different measures.  Table 1 
provides a short explanation and descriptive statistics about each dispersion variable and the 
other explanatory variables that are described in the next subsection.  Each measure of dispersion 
used takes 12 players into account for each team because it is a requirement in the NBA that each 
team has at least 12 signed players at any given time.  There are many more players that are 
signed to teams throughout a season, but they normally are signed to 10-day or 1-month 
contracts and, therefore, would be outliers in this study.  Each measure of dispersion is predicted 
to have a positive effect on wins as well as on revenue. 
The first measure of dispersion is each teams’ Gini coefficient.  The Gini coefficient  
measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution.  The possible values of the 
coefficient range from zero to one, 
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Table 1: Explanation and Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable  Definition Minimum Maximum Mean St. Dev. 
Dependent Variables 
     
Model A 
     
Wins Number of Regular Season Wins per NBA Team 12 67 41.00 12.89 
Model B 
     
Revenue Total Revenue of NBA Team $81,000,000 $226,000,000 $124,350,000 $31,594,769 
Explanatory Variables 
     
Models A & B 
     
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient of NBA Team 0.15223 0.60316 0.40930 0.08219 
Standard Deviation Stnd. Dev. of NBA Team's Salaries  1,216,443.42   8,595,963.05   4,538,701.43   1,309,843.75  
Top Player as % of 
Total Team Salary 
Top Player's Salary as a Percentage of Total 
Team Salary 11.76% 35.31% 23.46% 4.49% 
Top 2 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary 
Top 2 Players' Salary as a Percentage of 
Total Team Salary 23.48% 65.13% 40.57% 6.58% 
Top 3 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary 
Top 3 Players' Salary as a Percentage of 
Total Team Salary 34.40% 78.29% 54.05% 7.89% 
Gini Coefficient2 Gini Coefficient of NBA Team Squared 0.02317 0.36380 0.17414 0.06486 
Standard Deviation2 Stnd. Dev. of NBA Team's Salaries Squared 1.48E+12 7.39E+13 2.23E+13 1.24E+13 
Top Player as % of 
Total Team Salary2 
Top Player's Salary as a Percentage of Total 
Team Salary Squared 1.38% 12.47% 5.70% 2.12% 
Top 2 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary2 
Top 2 Players' Salary as a Percentage of 
Total Team Salary Squared 5.52% 42.42% 16.89% 5.42% 
Top 3 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary2 
Top 3 Players' Salary as a Percentage of 
Total Team Salary Squared 1.18% 61.29% 29.83% 8.78% 
TVMarketSize Number of Homes with TV's in Metro Area 
of Each NBA Team's Home City 566,960.00 7,515,330.00 2,350,181.73 1,822,547.28 
LuxuryTaxAbove A Team With Total Salary That is Above the Luxury Tax Level 0 1 0.39 0.49 
LuxuryTaxBelow A Team With Total Salary That is Below the Luxury Tax Level 0 1 0.60 0.49 
Fixed Effect 06-07 Team Competing in the 2006-07 Season 0 1 0.20 0.40 
Fixed Effect 07-08 Team Competing in the 2007-08 Season 0 1 0.20 0.40 
Fixed Effect 08-09 Team Competing in the 2008-09 Season 0 1 0.20 0.40 
Fixed Effect 09-10 Team Competing in the 2009-10 Season 0 1 0.20 0.40 
Fixed Effect 10-11 Team Competing in the 2010-11 Season 0 1 0.20 0.40 
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with zero being perfect equality and one being perfect inequality.  Normally the coefficient is 
applied to measure the distribution of income in a country or region.  In this case, the measure is 
used to determine  income dispersion within NBA teams.  This measure of dispersion is different 
from those commonly used  to test the effect of salary dispersion on performance and revenue.  
However, the Gini coefficient, while being a good overall indicator of the dispersion that exists 
on a team, does not explicitly address the affect of superstars’ salaries.   
In order to calculate each team’s Gini coefficient, a Lorenz Curve is constructed for each 
team.  The Lorenz Curve is a graphical representation that shows the degree of inequality that 
exists in the distributions of two variables (Byrnes, 2012).  The two variables in this case are the 
population of each basketball team (12 players) and the amount of total salary.  Figure 6 presents 
a typical Lorenz Curve and gives insight into how the Gini coefficient for each team is calculated.  
The number of players on a team is represented on the horizontal axis from one to 12.  Player 
one is the player on the team that is paid the lowest amount of salary, while player 12 is the 
player on the team that is paid the highest amount of salary.  The cumulative percent of salary 
paid by the team is represented by the vertical axis.  This creates an upward rising curve from 
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player one to player 12. The perfect distribution line in Figure 6 represents perfect equality of 
income.  As a result of no teams having perfectly equal distribution of salaries, no team’s 
distribution follows the perfect distribution line.  The Lorenz Curve represented in Figure 6 is 
more similar to that of a typical NBA team.  The Gini coefficient is calculated by dividing the 
area in between the perfect distribution line and Lorenz Curve by the total area under the perfect 
distribution line.  In terms of Figure 6, the Gini coefficient is the highlighted area divided by the 
entire triangle that is created from the 45 degree perfect distribution line.  This method of 
calculating the Gini coefficient is applied to each team in this study to determine each team’s 
respective Gini coefficient for each season.  
The second measure of dispersion that is used is the standard deviation of each team’s 
player salaries.  This, like the Gini coefficient, is a representative measure of the dispersion that 
takes all players salaries into account.  As the standard deviation of salaries increases, the wage 
dispersion on a team increases as well.  This measure of dispersion has been used in past studies, 
however, it has not been utilized for the time frame that this study is reviewing (Berri, 2004).  
The effect of standard deviation on wins and revenue might be different in this study because of 
recent changes in the CBA, changes in the number of superstars in the league, and evolution of 
contract sizes in the NBA. 
The last three measures of dispersion are all related.  They are the top player salary as a 
percent of total team salary, top two player salaries as a percent of total team salary, and top 
three player salaries as a percent of total team salary (from now on referred to as TOP1, TOP2, 
and TOP3 respectively).  These measures, unlike the first two, do focus on superstars’ salaries 
compared to the rest of the team and not just overall distribution of team salary.  Obviously, the 
higher the percentage of salary paid to top players, the greater the wage dispersion.  These 
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measures, have not been applied in published studies to test the effect salary dispersion has on 
team wins and revenue.  Despite this, they are measures that completely take into account the 
salary of superstars and are a good representative measure of a team’s salary dispersion.                 
C. Other Explanatory Variables 
The other explanatory variables are the same in both the wins model and the revenue 
model.  Despite the fact that this study is attempting to find the “best” amount of salary 
dispersion for an NBA team, other variables must be included in this model to control for other 
circumstances. 
Dispersion Squared is the square of the respective dispersion measure for each regression.  
This is used in the empirical model to attempt to see if there is a parabolic curvature to the effect 
dispersion has on both wins and revenue.  If there is, the maximum point on that curve would 
represent the “best” amount of dispersion for wins or revenue respectively.  The predicted sign of 
this variable is negative, which would create a concave curve and, therefore, a maximum point 
representing the “best” possible dispersion level. 
The television market size is a variable that controls for the metropolitan size of each 
NBA team.  This takes into account the number of homes with a television in the metropolitan 
area of each NBA teams’ home city.  It seems obvious that the size of a team’s market should 
have an impact on the amount of revenue generated throughout a season.  It is also plausible that 
the market size could have an impact on wins as well considering the possibility of there being 
more money available from increased revenue for big market teams.  There has historically been 
very little revenue sharing in the NBA, which makes the possibility of market size having an 
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impact on wins even greater (Dosh, 2001).  The market size variable is predicted to contain a 
positive effect on both team wins and revenue.    
The next explanatory variable is a dummy variable that takes into account a team’s salary 
position relative to the luxury tax level.  The luxury tax level is greater than the salary cap level 
and needs to be controlled for in the study.  This is because teams can have payrolls that exceed 
the salary cap due to certain league exceptions and are not punished for that, but are punished for 
exceeding the luxury tax level threshold.  As a result of this, most teams have a payroll that does 
exceed the salary cap, but only some teams have a payroll that exceeds the luxury tax level.  A 
luxury tax dummy variable is equal to one if the team has a payroll that is over the luxury tax 
threshold. The above luxury tax dummy variable, in this sense, is a proxy for the level of a 
team’s payroll and is predicted to be positively correlated with wins and revenue.  If teams are 
spending enough money to have a payroll that exceeds the luxury tax level, they most likely have 
a number of superstars that should create more wins and revenue.   
The last variables are fixed effect dummy variables for time.  These are included to deal 
with possible omitted variable bias.  They control for things not already controlled for in the 
regression that may be correlated with time.  Fixed effect dummy variables are defined for each 
year except for 2010-11 which is the reference year for each model.  Each of the five seasons has 
its own dummy variable associated with it.  There is no logical predicted relationship of the time 
dummy variables on wins and revenue.     
Wins Model: Wins = ß0 + ß1(Dispersion Measure) + ß2 (Dispersion Measure2) + ß3(MRKT)  + 
ß4(LXTABOVE ) + ß5(FE06-07) + ß6(FE07-08) + ß7(FE08-09) + ß8(FE09-10) + µ 
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Revenue Model: Revenue = ß0 + ß1(Dispersion Measure) + ß2 (Dispersion Measure2) + 
ß3(MRKT) + ß4(LXTABOVE) + ß5(FE06-07) + ß6(FE07-08) + ß7(FE08-09) + ß8(FE09-10)  +  µ 
V. Results 
The results proceed in four separate subsections.  The first subsection describes the 
insignificance of the dispersion measure squared variables and provides a justification for 
dropping them from the analysis.  The second subsection presents the results of the Wins Model 
and the affect dispersion has on the number of wins a team achieves, and the third subsection 
presents the results of the Revenue Model and the affect dispersion has on the amount of revenue 
a team generates.  Lastly, the indirect relationship of salary dispersion and revenue through wins 
is discussed. 
A. Insignificance of Dispersion Measure Squared 
After employing every regression in both models, the dispersion measure squared 
variable is always found to be insignificant.  With the dispersion factor squared variable being 
insignificant, it is no longer possible to determine the exact “best” amount of salary dispersion 
for an NBA team.  This is because the dispersion factor squared variable is responsible for 
creating the parabolic shape to the curve and, therefore, a max value of wins or revenue 
(depending on which model is being applied) according to dispersion.  With dispersion factor 
squared being insignificant, the parabolic curve that it creates is insignificant and the point that 
represents the “best” amount of dispersion on the curve is not relevant.  As a result of this, the 
dispersion measure squared variable is removed from each regression tested, which results in a 
linear curve instead of a parabolic curve.  With a linear curve, a specific optimal level of 
dispersion cannot be found, however, the effect dispersion has on wins and revenue is still able 
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to be seen.  The effect that is represented by the linear curve will result in the optimal amount of 
dispersion to be either zero dispersion or the maximum amount of dispersion possible.    
B. Wins Model 
Five different regressions are run to determine the effect of salary dispersion on team 
wins.  Table 2 presents the results of the five OLS regressions.  Each regression tests a different 
dispersion measure.  All of the other explanatory variables besides the dispersion measure 
remain constant in each regression of the Wins Model. 
Each measure of dispersion tested, the most important variables to this study, reveals that 
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between team wage dispersion and the 
number of wins.  As can be seen in Table 2, four of the five measures of dispersion are 
significant at the 1% level.  The TOP1 measure is the only dispersion measure to not be 
statistically significant at the 5% level, but it is still statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Next, a simulation is conducted to assess the magnitude of dispersion in determining wins.    
First, the standard deviation of each dispersion measure is calculated (provided in Table 1).  
Second, the standard deviation of the dispersion measure is multiplied times the coefficient of 
the dispersion measure found in Table 2.  In terms of the Gini coefficient dispersion level, a one 
standard deviation increase in Gini coefficient will lead to 3.75 more wins during a season.  
When using the standard deviation of player salaries as the measure of dispersion, a team will 
generate 5.50 more wins when a team increases their total dispersion level by one standard 
deviation.  These results show that having dispersion not only among superstars and regular 
players but across the entire team impacts wins in a positive manner. 
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Table 2: Regression Results Predicting Wins  
  
Wins Model 
  
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Dependent Variable Wins Wins Wins Wins Wins 
Gini Coefficient 45.68    (3.883)*** - - - - 
Standard Deviation - 4.20E-6             (4.988)*** - - - 
Top Player as % of Total 
Team Salary - - 
39.99                     
(1.758)* - - 
Top 2 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary - - - 
46.16    
(3.073)*** - 
Top 3 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary - - - - 
48.60                
(3.992)*** 
TVMarketSize -1.52E-6              (-2.935)*** 
-1.74E-6               
(-3.418)*** 
-1.45E-6              
(-2.663)*** 
-1.63E-6                
(-3.033)*** 
-1.66E-6                
(-3.177)*** 
LuxuryTaxAboveDummy 9.85                  (4.574)*** 
4.73                       
(1.938)* 
11.04                
(4.988)*** 
10.87                
(5.019)*** 
10.32                
(4.846)*** 
Fixed Effect 06-07 .15                           (.049) 
1.36          
(.473) 
-.07                          
(-.024) 
.02                           
(.005) 
.31                            
(.106) 
Fixed Effect 07-08 -.56                         (-.188) 
.30                           
(.103) 
-.92                       
(-.298) 
-.85                         
(-.281) 
-.91                         
(-.308) 
Fixed Effect 08-09 .10                           (.034) 
-.57                         
(-.200) 
-.16                         
(-.051) 
.01                           
(.002) 
-.11                         
(-.037) 
Fixed Effect 09-10 -3.91                       (-1.219) 
-2.50                       
(-.792) 
-5.01                       
(-1.502) 
-4.87                       
(-1.501) 
-4.63                       
(-1.459) 
Fixed Effect 10-11 - - - - - 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.261 0.150 0.186 0.219 
F-Value 6.829 8.522 4.760 5.856 6.977 
Sample Size 150 150 150 150 150 
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. 
         *** = significant at .01 level 
         ** = significant at .05 level 
         * = significant at .10 level 
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The other three dispersion measures (TOP1, TOP2, and TOP3) also show a positive 
correlation with wins.  The results become more significant and contain a larger effect with every 
additional player being included in the percent of total salary.  For example, using the TOP1 
measure contains a less significant and smaller effect on wins than does the TOP3 measure.  
These measures of dispersion only take the dispersion that exists from the highest paid players 
on a team compared to everyone else. The results indicate that the greater the salary dispersion of 
top paid players in comparison to the lower paid players, the more wins a team will achieve.  The 
simulations of the effects of a one standard deviation change in the three dispersion measures 
(TOP1, TOP2, and TOP3) yield interesting results.   A one standard deviation increase in TOP1, 
TOP2, and TOP3 is estimated to lead a team to win 1.80, 3.04, and 3.83 more games respectively 
in a season. 
In all the regressions, the market size control variable is the only variable to have an 
opposite effect than what was predicted.  This is a result that, at first, appears to have no logic.  
After reviewing the data, however, a reason for the size of the market negatively affecting wins 
emerges.  A number of the big markets in the United States have two NBA teams.  Both of these 
teams in each respective market technically have the same market size.  In reality, however, one 
team most likely dominates the popularity within the market.  For example, the New York 
Knicks and New Jersey Nets share the same New York City metropolitan market.  The Knicks, 
however, are the much more popular team, while the Nets do not have nearly as many followers.  
This means the Nets really have a lower market size than would be reported by ratings systems.  
This effect is one possible explanation for the market size negatively affecting the number of 
wins achieved by an NBA team.  
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Every other control variable behaves according to the presumed logic.  All of the fixed 
effect variables are statistically insignificant in all of the five regressions.   
The market size had a statistically significant negative effect on the number of wins a 
team achieves during the regular season for each dispersion level tested.  The coefficients of 
market size somewhat change depending on the measure of dispersion tested, but not by a great 
amount.  If the market size of a team increases by one standard deviation, which is 1,822,547 
people, a team will win anywhere from 2.64 to 3.17 less games throughout a season depending 
on the dispersion measure tested.  
The luxury tax variable also contained statistically significant effects on wins for every 
measure of dispersion tested.  This variable was positively correlated with the number of wins 
achieved.    Depending on the measure of dispersion used, a team that has a payroll over the 
luxury tax level will obtain anywhere from 4.73 to 11.04 more wins.   
These results do not show the specific amount of salary dispersion that is optimal for a 
team that has a goal of maximizing wins, however, they do show the linear effects of salary 
dispersion on wins.  The results indicate that the greater the wage dispersion, the greater the 
number of wins achieved. 
C. Revenue Regression 
Similarly to the Wins Model, five different regressions are run to estimate the effect 
salary dispersion within a team has on team revenue.  Table 3 presents the results of the five 
OLS regressions.  Each regression tests a different dispersion measure.  All of the other 
explanatory variables besides the dispersion measure remain constant in each regression of the 
Revenue Model. 
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Table 3: Regression Results Predicting Revenue  
  
Revenue Model 
  
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Dependent Variable Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
Gini Coefficient 
 
26,471,653.47            
(.984)  
- - - - 
Standard Deviation - 5.11                    (2.627)*** - - - 
Top Player as % of Total 
Team Salary - - 
7,225,121.60            
(.144) - - 
Top 2 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary - - - 
34,842,116.53          
(1.033) - 
Top 3 Players as % of 
Total Team Salary - - - - 
37,529,509.59          
(1.348) 
TVMarketSize 6.96                    (5.863)*** 
6.54                  
(5.576)*** 
7.07                    
(5.885)*** 
6.84                    
(5.675)*** 
6.81                    
(5.697)*** 
LuxuryTaxAboveDummy 29,756,439.65    (6.040)*** 
22,639,005.64    
(4.017)*** 
30,523,010.42    
(6.253)*** 
30,283,890.81    
(6.226)*** 
29,854,020.91    
(6.127)*** 
Fixed Effect 06-07 -1.08E7                    (-1.601) 
-9,443,672.39          
(-1.421) 
-1.08E7                    
(-1.589) 
-1.10E7                    
(-1.620) 
-1.07E7                    
(-1.591) 
Fixed Effect 07-08 -9,330,021.43          (-1.376) 
-7,939,754.83          
(-1.191) 
-9,613,850.40          
(-1.414) 
-9,452,187.99          
(-1.396) 
-9,494,599.63          
(-1.406) 
Fixed Effect 08-09 -7,593,773.59          (-1.120) 
-7,874,987.25          
(-1.188) 
-7,978,633.39          
(-1.169) 
-7,517,117.55          
(-1.108) 
-7,592,407.54          
(-1.124) 
Fixed Effect 09-10 -2.04E7                 (-2.777)*** 
-1.733E7              
(-2.384)** 
-2.14E7                
(-2.907)** 
-2.07E7              
(-2.849)*** 
-2.05E7              
(-2.830)*** 
Fixed Effect 10-11 - - - - - 
Adjusted R2 0.345 0.371 0.341 0.345 0.349 
F-Value 12.208 13.557 11.993 12.231 12.401 
Sample Size 150 150 150 150 150 
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. 
         *** = significant at .01 level 
         ** = significant at .05 level 
         * = significant at .10 level 
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In terms of the dispersion measures, there are conflicting results.  Every dispersion 
measure carries a positive impact on revenue, but four of the five measures of dispersion are not 
statistically significant.  The standard deviation measure of dispersion, however, shows a 
statistically significant relationship.  With an increase in one standard deviation of the standard 
deviation of player salaries, a team will generate $6,693,302.84 more in revenues.  It is 
interesting to note that the standard deviation of player salaries dispersion measure takes the 
dispersion across the whole team into account and not just the dispersion of superstars to regular 
players.  The measures of dispersion that take only superstars compared to regular players on a 
team into account (TOP1, TOP2, TOP3) show no statistical significance in the effect dispersion 
has on revenues.  
These results, similarly to the Wins Model, do not show a specific optimal amount of 
salary dispersion for a revenue maximizing team, but they do show the effects salary dispersion 
has on revenue.  The most common result is that salary dispersion does not significantly affect 
revenues, but the model that measures dispersion by standard deviation does show that the 
greater the amount of dispersion, the greater the revenue generated. 
Every control variable behaves according to the presumed logic and contains the  
predicted sign.  The fixed effect variables were, once again, largely statistically insignificant.  
The one difference, however, is that in each regression, the Fixed Effect 09-10 variable was 
significant and negative.  This shows that something related to time and unaccounted for in this 
study caused lower revenues during the 2009-10 season in relation to the 2010-11 NBA season 
(the omitted season for control purposes).  The market size and luxury tax variables are 
extremely significant in every regression and both contain a large positive effect on revenue.  In 
terms of the market size, depending on the measure of dispersion used, an increase of one 
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standard deviation of market size would cause an NBA team to increase their revenue anywhere 
from $11,919,459.21 to $12,885,409.27.  In terms of the luxury tax variable, a team that has a 
payroll over the luxury tax level will generate anywhere from $22,639,005.64 to $30,523,010.42 
extra in revenue.   
D. Indirect Effect of Dispersion on Revenues Through Wins  
The theory and logic behind dispersion affecting revenue seems very strong, but the 
results indicate generally insignificant effects.  However, there may be an indirect path whereby 
dispersion affects revenue.  This indirect path has two steps: first, dispersion affecting wins in a 
significant way; second, wins affecting revenue in a significant way.  If this is the case, 
dispersion can influence revenue indirectly through its influence on wins.  In every regression of 
the Wins Model, dispersion has a significant impact on wins.  If number of wins is a significant 
variable in affecting revenue, then salary dispersion would have an indirect effect on revenues.  
To test this, a regression is carried out to test if number of wins is a significant variable in 
determining revenue.  The empirical model utilized is the same as the Revenue Model with the 
exception of substituting the dispersion measure variable with the number of wins variable. The 
results from the regression are provided in Table 4.  The result shows that for every extra win a 
team achieves, revenues increase by $895,766.82.  This result is statistically significant to the 1% 
level. 
With this result, a point estimate can be deduced to find the indirect effect of dispersion 
on revenue through wins.  A simulation is conducted to measure the indirect effect.  The number 
of extra wins a team achieves with an increase of one standard deviation of each respective 
dispersion measure multiplied by the $895,766.82 that revenue increases per win would provide 
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the point estimate of the indirect relationship of each dispersion measure.  Table 5 provides all 
the relevant information for calculating the point estimates of the indirect effect of 
Table 4 : Regression Results Predicting 
Revenue Using Wins 
  
Revenue 
Model 
  
Regression 1 
Dependent Variable Revenue 
Wins  895,766.82            (5.363)***  
TVMarketSize 8.25                    (7.502)*** 
LuxuryTaxAboveDummy 20,494,260.60    (4.247)*** 
Fixed Effect 06-07 -1.10E7                    (-1.779)* 
Fixed Effect 07-08 -8,656,316.27          (-1.396) 
Fixed Effect 08-09 -7,416,123.33          (-1.198) 
Fixed Effect 09-10 -1.62E7                 (-2.422)** 
Fixed Effect 10-11 - 
Adjusted R2 0.452 
F-Value 18.526 
Sample Size 150 
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-
statistics. 
         *** = significant at .01 level 
         ** = significant at .05 level 
         * = significant at .10 level 
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salary dispersion on revenue through wins as well as presents the actual point estimates.  These 
values are only point estimates and a bootstrapping procedure needs to be applied in order to 
determine the variance of these results.  Krinsky and Robb have demonstrated the bootstrapping 
procedure in previous literature and have determined variances from point estimates (Krinsky et 
al, 1986).  This study, however, does not delve into the bootstrapping process, but the findings 
do indicate the possibility of strong indirect effects.   
Table 5: Point Estimates of Indirect Effect of Salary Dispersion on Revenue Through Wins 
Dispersion Measure 
Amount of Revenue 
Generated for Each 
Extra Win 
Number of Extra Wins a Team 
Achieves With an Increase in 
One Standard Deviation of 
Dispersion Measure 
Point Estimate of Indirect 
Effect of Salary Dispersion 
on Revenue Through Wins 
Gini Coefficient $895,766.82 3.75 $3,359,125.58 
Standard Deviation $895,766.82 5.50 $4,926,717.51 
Top Player as % of 
Total Team Salary $895,766.82 1.80 $1,612,380.28 
Top 2 Players as % 
of Total Team Salary $895,766.82 3.04 $2,723,131.13 
Top 3 Players as % 
of Total Team Salary $895,766.82 3.83 $3,430,786.92 
                  
VI. Conclusions 
The relatively new phenomenon of large disparities in salary among an NBA team has 
allowed a number of studies to be completed to test the effect that salary dispersion has on an 
organization.  The aim of this study was to determine the “best” amount of salary dispersion for 
both a win maximizing NBA team and a revenue maximizing NBA team.  Salary dispersion can 
be defined in a multitude of different ways. In order to most effectively deal with this issue, five 
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different measures of dispersion are used in this study.  Two of these measures deal with 
dispersion across an entire team while the other three deal with the amount of dispersion between 
superstars/team’s highest paid players and the regular skilled players on a team. Using data from 
the 2006-07 season to the 2010-11 season, two empirical models were constructed and ten 
regressions employed that could help determine the “best” amount of dispersion for both types of 
teams.   
It is interesting to discover, however, that after these models were tested, a specific “best” 
amount of salary dispersion is not able to be determined from the results.  Despite this, the effect 
salary dispersion has on the number of wins a team achieves and amount of revenue a team 
generates is able to be determined.   
Based on the results of this study, salary dispersion has a significant positive effect on the 
number of wins a team achieves throughout a season for all five definitions of dispersion.  This 
relationship suggests that the “best” amount of salary dispersion is the maximum amount of 
dispersion possible given the salary constraints a team faces.   
The results also indicate that salary dispersion contains a statistically insignificant effect 
on the amount of revenue a team achieves.  Only one of the five measures of dispersion, the 
standard deviation of salaries, indicates that wage inequality significantly affects revenues.  In 
general, there does not seem to be an optimal level of salary dispersion for generating revenue.  
After further tests, however, it is found that salary dispersion has a statistically significant 
positive indirect effect on revenues through wins.    
The results that salary dispersion positively affects the number of wins achieved and that 
the direct relationship of dispersion and revenue is insignificant is in contradiction to previous 
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literature. A possible reason for this contradiction is that all previous studies have investigated 
data from seasons when a different CBA was in effect.  Berri and Jewell (2004) performed a 
study in an attempt to relate salary dispersion and the number of wins an NBA team achieves.  
They found that salary dispersion is not a significant predictor of number of wins.  Their 
definition of dispersion was based on the standard deviation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
which is a different definition than employed by this study, which could be another reason for 
the difference in results.   
Katayama and Nuch (2011) also completed a study attempting to relate the salary 
dispersion among an NBA team and the number of wins achieved.  They tested three different 
dispersion levels (players participating in every game for a given team, players participating in at 
least half of the games for a given team, and every player on payroll for a given team) and found 
salary dispersion to have no significant effect on the number of wins a team achieves.  Once 
again, the definition of dispersion differed from Katayama and Nuch’s study to this study.   
Hausman and Leonard (1997) found superstars to have a high positive effect on total 
team revenue.  The study just completed does not necessarily look at superstars specifically and 
their effect on revenue, but instead, the effect salary dispersion has on team revenue.  Built into a 
number of the measures of dispersion, however, is the effect a superstar should carry.  The TOP1, 
TOP2, and TOP3 salary dispersion measures take into account the dispersion that exists between 
the superstars of a team and the regular players.  Teams with more superstars will have a higher 
percentage of money given to their top players and, therefore, if superstars did affect revenues 
positively, the dispersion measures would have a significant positive effect on revenue.  The fact 
that these dispersion measures do not have a significant effect on team revenue alludes to the 
idea that superstars do not have a significant effect on revenues, which is in complete 
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contradiction to Hausman and Leonard’s study.  Hausman and Leonard’s study, however, took 
place during the time period of the NBA where there was no maximum salary for players, which 
is not the case for the study that was just completed here.  According to Rosen and Oi (1981, 
2008), part of the reason people are attracted to superstars is the extreme amount of money they 
receive.  If this is in fact true, it is possible that setting a maximum salary for an individual player 
does not allow fans to reach their highest level of intrigue and therefore provide less revenue to 
the firm. 
Based on the results from this study, an NBA team that wants to maximize wins should 
try to employ as much dispersion of wages as possible and try to acquire as many superstars as 
possible filling the remaining spots on their roster with low salary players.  This seems to show 
that there must not be that great of a drop-off in talent level of the lower salaried players in the 
league and the middle salaried players.  For a win maximizing team, general managers should 
get as many high-skilled, and therefore high-paid, players signed to their team as possible and 
then complete the roster with low-paid players instead of signing all middle-value players. Those 
teams that are most successful at signing superstars will have the most success. 
This result can be connected back to the competitive imbalance problem that exists in the 
NBA today.  The fact that greater salary dispersion leads to greater number of wins suggests one 
reason for the competitive imbalance problem.  As already noted, teams most successful at 
signing superstars will have the most success on the court.  With superstars in limited supply and 
the NBA instituting a soft salary cap with many exceptions to the rule, certain teams are 
presented the opportunity to become more successful in signing superstars.  These teams that are 
able to do so will dominate the league in terms of number of wins.           
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In terms of policy implications of salary dispersion and revenues, the conclusions drawn 
from this study are more tentative.  With salary dispersion having no direct significant effect on 
revenue it is impossible to state what an NBA team should strive to do in terms of salary 
dispersion to generate the most revenue.  It seems, however, when looking at the indirect effect 
of salary dispersion on revenue through wins, more dispersion leads to more revenue.  As a result 
of this, a revenue maximizing team should try to employ as much wage disparity as possible 
given the constraints.  This implication is not as strong as the win maximizing team implication 
due to the nature of the indirect effect versus the direct effects. 
These results might be able to be translated into other fields of business.  Based off of 
these results, it is possible that in service business environments where team performance is 
important, like it is in the NBA, managers may benefit from hiring as many top notch employees 
at each respective job and then complete the hiring process with lower salaried workers.  This 
may lead to increases in performance.  This possibility suggests the need for future research that 
focuses on the applicability of NBA results on the non-sports sector. 
One possible way to further explore this research is to create even more definitions of 
salary dispersion and test each one to see if the effect/absence of effect does change depending 
on the definition of dispersion.  The definitions of dispersion utilized in this study may have a 
significant impact on the effect it has on both performance and revenue.  In addition to this, the 
indirect effect of dispersion on revenue needs to be addressed further.  The bootstrapping 
procedure needs to be applied to the point estimates in order to understand the variance of the 
indirect effect.  With a better and more complete understanding of how salary dispersion affects 
firm performance and revenue, NBA teams will be able to construct their teams more 
appropriately.  
31 
 
Work Cited 
Berri, David, and Todd Jewell. "Wage Inequality and Firm Performance: Professional 
Basketball's Natural Experiment." Atlantic Economic Journal 32.2 (2004): 130-39. Web  
Byrns, Ralph. "Economics Interactive." Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficients. University of North 
Carolina. Web. 30 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.unc.edu/depts/econ/byrns_web/Economicae/Figures/Lorenz.htm>. 
Coon, Larry. "NBA Salary Cap FAQ." 2011. Web. Sept. 2011. 
<http://members.cox.net/lmcoon/salarycap.htm>.  
Dosh, Kristi. "Want to Repair the NBA? Start With Revenue Sharing. - Forbes." Information for  
the World's Business Leaders - Forbes.com. Forbes, 09 Aug. 2011. Web. 20 Nov. 2011. 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/08/09/want-to-repair-the-nba-start-with-
revenue-sharing/>. 
Hausman, Jerry, and Gregory Leonard. "Superstars in the National Basketball Association: 
Economic Value and Policy." Journal of Labor Economics 15.4 (1997): 586-624. JSTOR. 
Web. Sept. 2011.  
Katayama, Hajime, and Hudan Nuch. "A Game-Level Analysis of Salary Dispersion and Team 
Performance in the National Basketball Association." Applied Economics 43.10-12 
(2011): 1193-1207. EconLit. EBSCO. Web. 21 Sept. 2011.  
Késenne, Stefan. The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports: an Analytical Treatment. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007. Print. 
Krinsky, I and A. L. Robb. 1986. “On Approximating the Statistical Properties of Elasticities.” 
Review of Economic and Statistics 68: 715-719. Web. 30 March 2012 
"Local Television Market Universe Estimates." Nielsen. Web. 10 Oct. 2011. 
<http://www.nielson.com/content>. 
"National Basketball Association Salaries." USA Today. Web. Sept. 2011. 
<http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/basketball/nba/salaries/team>.  
"NBA.com." NBA. Web. 15 Oct. 2011. <http://www.nba.com/home/index.html>. 
Oi, Walter. "Superstars, Economics of." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. 
2008. Web. Sept. 2011.  
Rosen, Sherwin, and Allen Sanderson. "Labor Markets in Professional Sports." Journal of 
Economic Literature (2000). National Bureau of Economic Research. Web. Sept. 2011  
32 
 
Rosen, Sherwin. "Human Capital." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. 2008. 
Web. Sept. 2011.  
Rosen, Sherwin. "The Economics of Superstars." The American Economic Review. JSTOR, Dec. 
1981. Web. Sept. 2011  
“The Business Of Basketball." Information for the World's Business Leaders - Forbes.com. 
Forbes, 26 Jan. 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. 
<http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/32/basketball-valuations_land.html>. 
 
 
